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Testimony of David Fontana
Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School
United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution
“Judicial Reliance on Foreign Law”
Wednesday, December 14, 2011 at 10 a.m.
2141 Rayburn House Office Building

Thank you for your very kind invitation to appear before your Subcommittee today
to testify on this very important issue.
I am an Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School,
where I teach primarily in the areas of constitutional law and comparative constitutional
law.

I have published articles in scholarly journals as well as in general interest

publications on the use of foreign law in our federal courts, and these writings form the
basis for my testimony before you today. Once a year, I convene a discussion group of
scholars interested in American and comparative constitutional law.
There are several concerns I have with the proposed legislation, but in my
testimony I will focus on what the legislation means for federal courts deciding
constitutional issues. Foreign law can be helpful to courts as they decide the issues they
must decide to resolve constitutional cases, and so using foreign law has been accepted
across the ideological spectrum and throughout the history of the Supreme Court. My
statement is not meant to argue that foreign law is an emerging and controversial part of
deciding constitutional cases.



Instead, my statement is meant to demonstrate that



considering foreign law has been and largely remains an accepted practice, and this
legislation could dangerously interfere with that practice by banning it entirely.

I.

Preliminary Questions about the Meaning and Breadth of the Statute

Before I address my concerns about how this legislation would prevent federal
courts from deciding constitutional issues, I want to address two issues related to the
meaning (what does the legislation apply to?) and breadth (how far does it extend?) of the
legislation. It is important to clarify what I take this legislation to mean before I express
my apprehensions about it.
First, let me address some ambiguities with the legislation. The legislation prevents
courts from looking to foreign law “in whole or in part” as a form of “authority.” Does
the legislation simply prevent courts from looking to foreign law as a binding legal
precedent—in other words, does it prevent courts from considering foreign law in the
same sort of obligatory way courts might treat their own earlier decisions or any decision
by a higher court? If the legislation simply prevents courts from looking to foreign law as
a binding legal precedent, it would have very little or no effect. This is because most
would agree that courts hardly ever—if ever at all—look to foreign law in that fashion.1

1

There appears to be broad agreement with this proposition. During the hearings this Subcommittee held
on March 25, 2004 about a previous, related resolution, Representative Nadler stated that of the decisions
by the Supreme Court being discussed in that hearing, “none of these decisions have turned on a foreign
citation, nor have any been treated as binding.” See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of American Law: Hearing On H.Res. 568, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
House
Judiciary
Committee,
108th
Cong.
44-45
(2004),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/92673.PDF [hereinafter 2004 Hearing]. There have been more Court
decisions citing foreign law since then, but they are structured similarly to the decisions Representative
Nadler and others were discussing during that hearing. One of the witnesses more negative about the use of
foreign law, Professor Michael Ramsey of the University of San Diego School of Law, made similar
remarks later in the same hearing. See id. at 45 (“I think it’s probably correct so far to say that these





The legislation would be preventing a practice that does not exist, and I imagine
Congress wants to target its legislation at a range of practices that do exist.
Alternatively, does this legislation prevent federal courts from looking to foreign
law as any part of their process of deciding constitutional cases? If the legislation is
meant to prohibit federal courts from looking to foreign law even as persuasive
authority—as authority that does not bind courts in a formal sense but only affects courts
in so far as it convinces them2—then the legislation would prevent courts from looking to
foreign law in important ways.

I will therefore address that understanding of the

legislation in my statement.
A final relevant ambiguity in the legislation relates to its use of the phrase “foreign
law.” Based on remarks made by those on this Subcommittee in previous, related
hearings—and the cases that most troubled members of this Subcommittee and have lead
to proposed resolutions and now legislation—I will assume that “foreign law” is
referencing the full range of foreign legal materials. This means that the proposed
legislation would even prohibit the use of foreign legal experience as this experience is
utilized in a foreign legal case and in other discussions in foreign countries. As I will
highlight below, I think this usage of foreign legal experience is quite common and
accepted in American federal courts.

Because this usage appears to be what the

legislation is designed to address, and because this is how foreign law is often utilized, it
is this usage of foreign law I will address in my remarks.

citations of foreign authority haven’t had a substantial role in decisions that have been made.”). Professor
Ramsey still believed this issue to be an emerging issue, however. Of course, there is still some
disagreement about whether or not foreign law is being used in a more binding fashion in these cases. For
an illustrative example, see Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 148 (2005).
2
For my discussion of the use of foreign law as persuasive authority, see David Fontana, Refined
Comparativism in Foreign Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 557-59 (2001).





Second, because I am focusing exclusively on how this would affect constitutional
decisions, I will bracket entirely the disruptive effects this legislation could have on
international business transactions. The legislation could be read to apply quite broadly
in ways that would stifle not just federal judicial decisions in the area I will discuss
(constitutional law) but also in a range of other areas, most notably international business
transactions.

American companies participating in the global economy often make

contracts with foreign companies that require American courts to apply foreign law to
decide a commercial dispute. The requirement in this legislation that all (including
commercial) disputes in federal courts be resolved only by looking to American law
could significantly deter foreign companies from engaging in commercial transactions
with American companies. It is for this reason that several pieces of state legislation
similar to the legislation you have before you today have specified exceptions for
business transactions.3
With these questions about what the statute covers aside, let me turn to the principal
focus of my remarks: how this legislation threatens to undermine the ability of federal
courts to decide constitutional cases.

II.

Foreign Law Can Be Helpful for Courts Deciding Constitutional Issues

Foreign law can be an important part of deciding the constitutional issues that
federal courts must address, and excluding foreign law entirely threatens to exclude legal
materials that are both helpful and probative in deciding constitutional cases. There are

3

See, e.g., S. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011) (“This section shall not apply to a corporation,
partnership, or other form of business association.”).





certain questions courts must answer in deciding constitutional cases—questions that
liberals and conservatives almost all agree are important questions—that call for the
kinds of insights that foreign law can provide. For instance, in deciding whether or not a
race-conscious governmental program violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts must
address whether or not these programs are “narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental measures.”4 In other words, as part of assessing whether or not
the program was “narrowly tailored,” courts must address whether there are other policy
alternatives that would pursue the same goals but treat groups more equally. Foreign law
can be helpful here: in surveying the practices of not just governments in the United
States, but governments elsewhere, are there other ways to pursue these goals without
having to make distinctions based on race?
Another part of this question the Court has to answer in these cases is whether raceconscious programs serve “compelling governmental measures.” Do these programs
actually further important goals? Again, this is a factual question that calls for all relevant
information. It might be that foreign law shows that race-based programs work very
poorly, or work very well. Either way, that answer is relevant to answering the factual
question of whether or not these programs further important goals.
There would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal law that
they cannot consider at all the “percent plans” adopted by states like Texas that guarantee
the top percentage of graduating classes admissions to certain public institutions. These
plans could illustrate other means of achieving what race-conscious plans try to achieve.
There would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal law that they

4

Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (plurality opinion) (citations to other cases
omitted).





cannot consider race-conscious programs in the military. These plans could show that
race-conscious plans do or do not achieve the ends they are trying to achieve.
Likewise, there would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal
law that they cannot consider foreign law that might answer the questions before these
courts. It is not because foreign law is foreign law that makes it relevant in these cases; it
is because foreign law is directly relevant to the questions everyone agrees courts must
answer to decide these cases.
As Justice Scalia has noted, foreign law can be relevant in this way,5 even though
this does not mean that foreign law defines the ultimate meaning of the Constitution.6
Our cherished protections are still the same cherished protections as they always have
been and hopefully will always be. Free speech remains First Amendment American free
speech, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures remains Fourth
Amendment American freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Foreign law
plays a role not in telling us to protect speech or in protecting us from searches or
seizures, but instead in answering the discrete questions posed by applying those
freedoms in specific situations.
Indeed, rather than ignoring or merely implementing the commands of the
Constitution, sometimes the commands of the Constitution seem to call for foreign law.
The Eighth Amendment, for instance, prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” It has
long been understood that part of determining what is “unusual” involves examining not

5

Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American
Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2004) in 98 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 304, 305, 307 (2004) (“It is
impossible to say that such materials are never relevant . . . What about modern foreign legal materials? Do
I ever consider them relevant to constitutional adjudication? . . . . the argument is sometimes made that a
particular holding will be disastrous . . . I think it entirely proper to point out that other countries have long
applied the same rule without disastrous consequences.”)
6
See id. (“It is my view that modern foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of—
to the meaning of—the U.S. Constitution.”) (italics omitted).





just American punishment practices, but foreign punishment practices.7 Just as we would
not want to prevent courts from considering the practices of the fifty states or the
practices over American history, so too we would not want to prevent courts from
assessing practices around the world to see whether a punishment is truly “unusual.”

III. There Is Broad Support for Using Foreign Law Across the Ideological
Spectrum and Across History

Given this role that foreign law can play in helping federal courts decide
constitutional issues, it should not be surprising that there has been broad support for
using foreign law in constitutional interpretation.

This broad support transcends

ideological lines among Justices and others, and is also reflected in the range of cases the
Supreme Court has decided over its history using foreign law. The issues raised by this
practice are important, but we should be cautious about disregarding the wide and longstanding support for this practice.
The current debate about the role of foreign law in constitutional interpretation on
the Supreme Court seems to assume that only some of the current and recent Justices
engage with foreign law—perhaps Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and
Sotomayor on the current Court, and before they retired Justices O’Connor and Stevens.8

7

The Supreme Court case that appeared to influence many of the modern Supreme Court cases using
foreign law in the Eighth Amendment context was Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (discussing
practices of “the civilized nations”).
8
Both sides seem to assume that the use of foreign law is more limited on the Court than is actually the
case. At the time of the July 19, 2005 hearing before this Subcommittee about a previous, related
resolution, all sitting Justices had at one point or another cited foreign law in their opinions. Sarah
Cleveland testified against the resolution, but noted that “[a]t least seven members of the current Supreme
Court have embraced the use of foreign authorities.” Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States: Hearing On H.Res. 97, Before the Subcommittee on





Justice Scalia is often cited for his speeches and opinions expressing doubts about using
foreign law.9
But Justice Scalia has written off the bench and in his opinions that foreign law can
be useful. In a speech in 2004, as mentioned above, he argued that foreign law could be
relevant in deciding constitutional cases. As he wrote in Thompson v. Oklahoma,10 “The
practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but
rather . . . occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well.”11 Justice Scalia referenced foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas12 to
argue about the potential consequences of that decision based on a similar Canadian
experience,13 and has referenced foreign law in many of his other decisions, including
some since the controversy about the use of foreign law first erupted.14
Justice Thomas has also cited foreign law.15 Among past Justices, the late Chief
Justice William Rehnquist16 and the late Chief Justice Warren Burger17 wrote notable
opinions citing foreign law. And this is just a partial list of Justices who have used

the Constitution, House Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. 39 (2005), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju22494.000/hju22494_0.HTM. Professor Cleveland
was appropriately cautious by using the word “embraced” and “at least.” Whether or not they had
“embraced” foreign law, though, all nine Justices in the Court at that time had employed it. Representative
Feeney stated at those same hearings that there were “three Justices that are remaining fixed on the
Constitution without reference foreign law.” See id. at 62. See also id. at 13 (“Six Supreme Court U.S.
justices have approvingly been described by Professor—actually Yale Law Dean Harold Koh—as
transnationalists.”).
9
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 307 (stating that “modern foreign legal materials” are “hardly ever”
relevant) (italics omitted).
10
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
11
Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13
See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14
See McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Schiro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004).
15
See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
16
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n. 16, 730, 734 (1997).
17
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).





foreign law in their opinions. Indeed, over the history of the Supreme Court, these
references to foreign law have been frequent. As Steven Calabresi, one of the founders
of the Federalist Society, wrote in a recent article:
The Supreme Court’s practice of citing and relying on foreign law goes back two
centuries . . . . If precedent and caselaw count for anything in constitutional law,
then the legitimacy of Supreme Court citation of foreign law is a long settled
issue.18
The Federalist Papers are replete with references to the constitutional practices of
several dozen different countries. Indeed, Federalist 63 states that “[a]n attention to the
judgment of other nations is important to every government.”19 Chief Justice John
Marshall cited foreign law in some of his important early constitutional law opinions. In
Marbury v. Madison 20—the 1803 Supreme Court case taught to so many of us as
announcing the cherished institution of judicial review—Chief Justice Marshall looked to
foreign law as part of his decision about whether judicial review was necessary for
constitutionalism.21
And at a time when attention has been focused on Court decisions using foreign
law to reach “liberal” outcomes, it is important to note that foreign law has been used to
reach outcomes not favored by liberals. For instance, foreign law was used in Bowers v.
Hardwick22 to deny a claim that an anti-sodomy law was constitutionally problematic, for
instance. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited to foreign law in Planned Parenthood v. Casey23
in arguing for the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion.24 As Justice Scalia has

18

Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City On A Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s
Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2006).
19
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 423 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
20
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
21
See id. at 163, 177-78.
22
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
23
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24
See id. at 945 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).





written, there are many ways in which foreign law can lead to more conservative as well
as more liberal outcomes.25
The range of those who believe that foreign law can sometimes be helpful was
reflected in a previous hearing this Subcommittee held on this issue in 2004. Several
witnesses called by sponsors of a resolution similar to the current proposed legislation
supported the occasional use of foreign law. One witness testified that “foreign law
could be relevant to prove a fact about the world which is relevant to the law . . . . I
would thus modify the resolution to make clear that these uses of foreign or international
law are legitimate.”26 Another witness made a similar point.27
To be sure, there are those Justices on the court now and before—and those
commentators writing about the use of foreign law now and before—who might be more
or less inclined to use foreign law more or less often. But there are very few Justices or
other experts who believe that foreign law is always completely irrelevant, as the
legislation seems to mandate.
In other words, because this legislation can be read to prohibit any use of foreign
law, this legislation would be telling the large majority of those working on these issues
now and over history that they are wrong.

This legislation would be telling John

Marshall, Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer that their opinions are deciding issues in a
way that has been prohibited as a matter of federal law. I would be hesitant to take such
steps given the widespread and long-standing agreement on this issue.

25

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Statement of John O. McGinnis, 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 31.
27
See Statement of Michael D. Ramsey, 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (“A . . . category of references to
foreign materials is more controversial, but, in my view, usually appropriate if done cautiously. These
references arise when the constitutionality of a U.S. law can be informed by facts existing in a foreign
country.”).
26





IV. A Brief Response to Concerns about Foreign Law

I will leave it to the excellent panelists and to the questions that members of the
Subcommittee might have to address in greater detail the concerns with looking to
foreign law. I take the major concerns to be that looking to foreign law is undemocratic
and unprincipled. Let me take each point in turn.
One criticism of using foreign law is that it is undemocratic—after all, citizens of
the United States did not vote for foreign judges, so why should their decisions affect our
American law? Simply put, courts do not decide constitutional cases based solely on
materials that the American people have voted for or ratified. The language of the
Constitution, the original understanding of that language, and information how about
those understandings work in practice (are they “narrowly tailored,” for instance) are all
relevant in deciding cases—and none of these have been democratically authorized by the
American people.
Considering foreign law also poses no democratic concerns because considering
foreign law does not mean adopting foreign law. Sources can be used negatively, as role
models of precisely what a court wants to avoid. This is true of domestic legal sources
and foreign legal sources. Just as we do not want another Dred Scott, and courts might
disavow that decision to help them reach a current decision, so too foreign law has been
used to highlight a foreign practice that our courts especially want to avoid.28
If Americans are troubled by judges considering foreign law, they have the same
options they have if Americans are troubled by anything else federal judges might do.

28

For a good example, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650-52 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).





Federal judges deciding any constitutional case are accountable to us because federal
judges are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and subject to
impeachment based on their conduct. If a judge puts forward a strained interpretation of
the First Amendment, for instance, the President might decide not to nominate that judge
for another position, the Senate might refuse to confirm that judge, and/or that judge
might be impeached and removed from office if his or her conduct is deemed sufficiently
problematic. The same is true here: if a judge uses foreign law when it is not needed or
unwise, he or she can be denied further appointment or confirmation, and/or impeached
and removed from office if his or her conduct is deemed sufficiently problematic.
Another concern is that judges applying foreign law have been and inevitably will
be unprincipled—how do they know in what cases foreign law is relevant, and in those
cases what foreign law to examine? These are difficult questions, but judges should
evaluate the relevance of foreign law in the same fashion as they evaluate the relevance
of other law. Judges define the constitutional questions they must answer and look for
the most relevant law to help them answer those questions. If a federal court has to
decide a free speech case, it knows to look for free speech cases. Likewise, if a federal
court has to decide an affirmative action case, it can look for foreign jurisdictions that
have decided cases about affirmative action. As Justice Breyer has written, our courts
have “long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have
applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly
comparable circumstances.”29
Sometimes the task is even less complicated. In Eighth Amendment cases, to
determine if a practice is “unusual,” the Court looks to materials from all countries to see

29



Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).



if they permit a particular practice. Rather than having to select more or less relevant
foreign jurisdictions, all foreign jurisdictions are relevant.30
I must freely admit that in practice our federal courts have been too selective in
considering foreign law, and that this does concern me. There is no reason why the
Supreme Court should look at foreign law in some Eighth Amendment cases and not
others, as has been the case recently. There is no reason why the Supreme Court should
look to foreign law in gay rights cases and not in abortion cases, as has been the case
recently. I do not think the proper response is to prevent the federal courts from looking
to foreign law entirely, but instead to find ways to have them look to foreign law more
consistently and more fairly. Developing a set of best practices will help courts use
foreign law better, and will help them understand foreign law better. This is how our
courts have thrived over several hundred years, and how they have mastered complicated
issues as these issues have come through the courthouse doors. Foreign law is no
different.

Thank you again for the opportunity to address this Subcommittee, and I look
forward to answering any questions you might have.


30

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming
weight of international opinion.”).





